“We arrived in Baghdad on May 1, 2003, the day President Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln off San Diego and declared the end of ‘major combat operations in Iraq,’ the ill-timed MISSION ACCOMPLISHED banner set high above on the ship’s island.”

So begins Collector: An Inside Account of U.S. Intelligence in the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. Detailing my experiences in human intelligence (HUMINT) in the first year of both wars, what unfolds is an increasingly dark chronicle of intelligence failure in the aftermath of 9/11.

Seen from the dual perspectives of a HUMINT analyst (Afghanistan) and HUMINT collector (Iraq), the various limitations both roles faced merged into grave uncertainties on the ground. Hobbled by poor planning, poor training, poor communications, virtually nonexistent top-level leadership, and a pitiful lack of resources for HUMINT operations, the U.S. military's tactical-level intelligence apparatus would inevitably prove ineffective against each war’s growing insurgency.

Through source meets in downtown Baghdad, detainee interrogations on the Syrian border, late-night house raids in the hinterlands of the “Sunni Triangle,” and classified briefings within the U.S. Army's top command in Afghanistan, U.S. HUMINT’s overall dysfunction will become abundantly clear. Unsparing and methodical, Collector ultimately ends as a warning of the grinding war years to come.